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TN the landmark case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
LCo., the Supreme Court held that it is a per se violation2 of Section 1
of the Sherman Act3 for a manufacturer to agree4 with a dealer on the
dealer's resale price.5 Although Dr. Miles has stood for seventy-four
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. B.B.A. 1965, Iowa
College of Business Administration; J.D. 1967, University of Iowa; L.LM. 1969,
Georgetown University.
1. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
2. See infra note 3.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 reads: "Every contract, combination ... or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade... is... illegal." Id. Because every commercial contract
restrains trade, see Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), the
Supreme Court has interpreted Section I as barring only unreasonable restraints. See
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); United States v.
Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1972); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
The test of reasonableness, the so-called rule of reason, has its origins in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1911). It was described in Justice Brandeis'
opinion in Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238. This statement of the rule of reason has been frequently cited by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982);
National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
Per se rules of illegality are applied to "certain agreements or practices which bemuse
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclu-
sively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct.
2948, 2962 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soe'y, 457 U.S. 332, 350-51
(1982). Under per se analysis, the plaintiff need not prove that defendant's behavior has
an anticompetitive effect. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960. "It is only
after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them
asperse violations of the Sherman Act." United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596,
607-08 (1972).
4. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reaches only those unreasonable restraints effected
by a "contract, combination.., or conspiracy," 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), not those that are
unilaterally imposed. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct.
2731, 2740 (1984); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
5. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 407-09.
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years, its per se condemnation of vertical price-fixing6 is highly contro-
versial.7 Justice Holmes, dissenting in Dr. Miles, stated: "I think that, at
least, it is safe to say that the most enlightened judicial policy is to let
people manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground
for interference is very clear."'  Justice Holmes could find no clear
ground for interfering with the freedom of a manufacturer and his retail-
ers to agree on a resale price.9 Justice Brandeis, although not on the
Court at the time Dr. Miles was decided, was of a similar view: "[A]
right in the individual manufacturer of a competitive business to market
his goods in his own way, by fixing, if he desired, the selling price to the
consumer, is in entire harmony with the underlying purposes of the Sher-
man Law."1° While Holmes' dissent was grounded on a laissez faire phi-
losophy,11 Brandeis thought vertical price-fixing was compatible with the
Sherman Act because it enabled independent retailers to compete more
effectively with chain stores. 2
As has been stated elsewhere, Brandeis and Holmes each "entertained
idiosyncratic views outside the mainstream of antitrust development."'13
6. Vertical price-fixing is effected when a manufacturer agrees impliedly or explicitly
with a distributor, either a wholesaler or a retailer, to set a price at which the goods will
be resold. See American Bar Association, Antitrust Law Developments (Second) 56 (2d
ed. 1984). For a description of nonprice vertical restriction, see infra note 31.
Vertical price-fixing is frequently referred to as "resale" or "retail price maintenance,"
especially where a manufacturer and retailers are involved. See, e.g., Chisolm Bros. Farm
Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 498 F.2d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Comanor, Vertical Price-fixing Vertical Market Restrictions, and
the New Antitrust Policy, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 983, 984 (1985); Posner, The Next Step in the
Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6, 6
(1981). The terms are synonymous and will be used interchangeably in this Article.
Horizontal price-fixing is effected when price is fixed by competitors on the same distri-
bution level. See American Bar Association, supra, at 28-29. Horizontal price-fixing, in
most cases, is per se illegal. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979).
7. See, eg., Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court:
An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition
Decisions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 282, 286-92 (1975); Posner, supra note 6, at 10-11. But see
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (Dr. Miles has received tacit approval from Congress for seventy-three years).
8. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
9. See id. at 411-12.
10. Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness, in The Miscellaneous Papers of Louis D. Brandeis
127 (1935).
11. See M. Handler, Antitrust in Perspective 20 (1957). The laissez faire doctrine has
been described as calling for "the limitation of governmental activity to the enforcement
of peace and. . . 'commutative justice,' to defense against foreign enemies, and to public
works regarded as essential and as impossible or highly improbable of establishment by
private enterprise or, for special reasons, unsuitable to be left to private operation."
Viner, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, 3 J.L. & Econ. 45, 45 (1960). Vertical
price-fixing could plausibly be viewed as raising an issue of commutative justice-the
justice of the system for exchange-and therefore a proper concern of government under
the laissez faire doctrine. Others might conceive commutative justice more narrowly.
12. See Brandeis, supra note 10, at 128.
13. M. Handler, supra note 11, at 21.
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Nevertheless, the enactment of the Miller-Tydings Act of 19374 was in
accord with Brandeis' view of vertical price-fixing as procompetitive."
The Act created a "fair trade" exception to the Sherman Act 6 by al-
lowing a manufacturer who sold goods marked with its trademark,
brand, or name which were in "free and open competition" with other
commodities of the same general class, to set the retail price for its goods,
provided state legislation authorized such resale price maintenance. 7 In
1952 the fair trade exception was broadened by adoption of the McGuire
Act,18 which exempted from antitrust laws vertical price-fixing agree-
ments that under state law bound not only retailers who were parties to
the agreement but also those who were not.19 Thus, if a manufacturer
entered into a retail price contract with at least one retailer in a state as
authorized by its fair trade statute, that price would automatically apply
to all other retailers of the product in the state, even though no other had
agreed to the contract price. When the McGuire Act was adopted, forty-
five states had such fair trade legislation.2'
The "free and open competition" requirement of fair trade legislation
recognized an important distinction between intrabrand and interbrand
competition.2" While vertical price-fixing is destructive of price competi-
tion between sellers of the same brand, it has no necessary impact on
price competition between sellers of different brands.' The Miller-Tyd-
ings exemption of vertical price-fixing thus existed only where there was
interbrand competition.23 Nonetheless, with the emergence of consumer-
ism in the 1970's, Congress repealed the Miller-Tydings and McGuire
14. Ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693, repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L
No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801.
15. See supra text accompanying note 10.
16. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 102-03 (1980).
17. See Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693, repealed by Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801; 1 E. Kintner, The
Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes 462 (1978).
18. Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 745, 66 Stat 631.
19. Id. at 632.
20. 1 E. Kintner, supra note 17, at 925.
21. The Supreme Court recently recognized this distinction as one of central impor-
tance to antitrust law:
Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the
same generic product... and is the primary concern of antitrust law. The
extreme example of a deficiency of interbrand competition is monopoly, where
there is only one manufacturer. In contrast, intrabrand competition is the com-
petition between the distributors-wholesale or retail-of the product of a par-
ticular manufacturer.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
22. See id. ("[When interbrand competition exists... it provides a significant check
on the exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to
substitute a different brand of the same product."); see also id. at 51-52 ("The market
impact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for a simultaneous
reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition.") (foot-
note omitted).
23. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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Acts.24 The Brandeis view that vertical price-fixing would increase inter-
brand competition by protecting small family-owned retail outlets was
rejected on several grounds.25 Instead, it was seen as leading to higher
prices through the destruction of intrabrand competition.26
The current law of vertical price-fixing is essentially where it was in
1934 prior to adoption of the Miller-Tydings Act, i.e., per se unlawful
without exception.27 While the Brandeis view has been thoroughly repu-
diated, the Holmes view seems to be undergoing revitalization. In 1983,
24. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801.
25. The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary stated:
The first difficulty with this argument is that it finds no support in the facts
Second, to the extent the 'Mon [sic] and Pop' retailer charges a higher price
because he is providing more services to his customers, consumers should have
the freedom to choose between paying more for those services and buying noth-
ing but the unadorned product at a lower price from a competitor ....
Moreover, there is some evidence that 'fair trade' laws can actually work to
stifle market entry to new small retail businesses.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-341, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1975).
26. See id. at 3 ("From the consumer's point of view, 'fair trade' has one effect-
higher prices.").
27. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977).
Although Dr. Miles is universally recognized as the first case to treat vertical price-fixing
as per se illegal, see Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminium, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-03
(1980); Posner, supra note 6, at 11 n.25, the Dr. Miles Court did not use the term "per se
illegality." It was not until after the repeal of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts that
the Supreme Court expressly declared that vertical price-fixing was per se illegal. See
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977).
The Justice Department takes the position that the repeal of the Miller-Tydings and
McGuire Acts did not imply that Congress viewed vertical price restraints as per so
illegal:
There is ... no necessary incongruity between the action of Congress in repeal-
ing the [Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts] and a rule of reason treatment of
[resale price maintenance] under the Sherman Act. The [federal] Fair Trade
Laws were far too sweeping a determination of per se legality, and [the Anti-
trust Division] agree[s] that they ought to have been repealed. In [the Antitrust
Division's] judgment, the action of Congress in 1976 [sic] does not preclude the
Supreme Court from reaching a conclusion that, although [resale price mainte-
nance] continues to be per se illegal in those contexts in which it might facilitate
horizontal collusion, it should be treated under the rule of reason in other con-
texts. Although both the House and Senate reports indicate awareness that the
Supreme Court had previously declared [retail price maintenance] illegal per so
and no doubt expected that they were remitting [retail price maintenance] to
that status by repealing the [Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts], it is also true
that there is nothing in the legislative history which indicates a congressional
disposition to limit the power of the courts to continue, through interpretation,
the evolution and adaptation of the Sherman Act in light of the continuing
development of microeconomic analysis.
Letter from Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter to Representative Robert Mc-
Clory (June 18, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Baxter Letter I], reprinted in 1983 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCII) 50,442, at 56,012. But see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) ("Congress recently has expressed its approval of a per se
analysis of vertical price restrictions by repealing those provisions of the Miller-Tydings
and McGuire Acts. .. ").
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William Baxter, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice, favored overruling Dr. Miles,
"not because it is clearly the right answer in any economic sense, but
because I have a strong bias in favor of letting people do whatever they
want, at least in the absence of a demonstration that they are imposing
harm on someone else ....
Although the government's current opposition to Dr. Miles's rule of
per se illegality29 may be grounded in laissez faire philosophy, it has a
legal basis in the case of Continental T. V., Ina v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 3 In
Sylvania the Court held that nonprice vertical restrictions,31 which limit
28. Baxter, Vertical Practices--Half Slav Half Free, 52 Antitrust L.J. 743, 750
(1983).
29. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter to Edward T.
Borda, President of the Association of General Merchandise Chains, Inc. (Iay 24, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Baxter Letter II], reprinted in Scherer, The Economics of Vertical
Restraints, 52 Antitrust LJ. 687, 709 app. A (1983); Scherer, supra, at 688. See supra
text accompanying note 28.
In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), the Court noted:
The Solicitor General (by brief only) and several other amici suggest that we
take this opportunity to reconsider whether 'contract[s], combination[s] .... or
conspirac[ies]' to fix resale prices should always be unlawful. They argue that
the economic effect of resale price maintenance is little different from agree-
ments on non-price restrictions .... They say that the economic objections to
resale price maintenance that we discussed in Sylvania. . -such as that it
facilitates horizontal cartels--can be met easily in the context of rule-of-reason
analysis.
Certainly in this case we have no occasion to consider the merits of this argu-
ment. This case was tried on per se instructions to the jury. Neither party
argued in the District Court that the rule of reason should apply to a vertical
price-fixing conspiracy nor raised the point on appeal. In fact, neither party
before this Court presses the argument advanced by amici. We therefore de-
cline to reach the question, and we decide the case in the context in which it was
decided below and argued here.
Id. at 761-62 n.7.
After the Justice Department's amicus brief was filed with the Court, Congress at-
tached to an appropriations bill an amendment that prohibited the Justice Department
from using any funds to overturn the per se rule. See Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102-03 (1983). In its argument before the Court
the Justice Department was limited to arguing for an exception to the Dr. Miles rule:
If a supplier adopts a bona fide distribution program that includes nonprice
restraints and if that program is reasonably addressed to distribution problems,
the case must be judged by the rule of reason unless the plaintiff can show...
an explicit agreement about the prices distributors are to charge.
See Arguments of the Justice Department in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 52
U.S.L.W. 3448, 3448 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1983) (emphasis in original). Under this rule, Dr.
Miles generally would be limited to express price agreements. The Court, however,
treated the Justice Department's arguments as if they were a request for the overruling of
Dr. Miles. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761-62 n.7.
30. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
31. Nonprice vertical restrictions take many forms:
[One is] the assignment of exclusive sales territories, which forbid the distribu-
tor or dealer to sell outside of a specified territory on pain of having its relation-
ship with the manufacturer terminated or, perhaps, of having to pay a "profit
passover" or some other charge to the distributor or dealer whose territory it
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where or to whom a dealer may sell, are subject to rule of reason analy-
sis,32 and overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 3 which had
held them per se unlawful.34 Because nonprice restrictions such as those
that specify the territory in which a dealer may resell his goods have the
same purpose and effect as vertical price-fixing-both are designed to in-
crease price and sales by reducing intrabrand competition-the Attorney
General claimed both should be subject to the same legal standard.3 5
Furthermore, the Sylvania right of a manufacturer to impose territo-
rial or other nonprice restrictions without running afoul of the per se rule
is an empty right, according to former Assistant Attorney General Bax-
ter, because a dealer terminated for violating a nonprice restriction may
sue for treble damages claiming he was terminated on account of his pric-
ing practices.36 Because it may be difficult to prove whether the dealer
was terminated for pricing or for other reasons, reliance on Sylvania is a
high-risk proposition.
These objections to Dr. Miles raise questions of both practice and the-
ory. At the practical level the question is whether price and nonprice
restraints can be distinguished in the real world. If not, Sylvania and Dr.
invaded. In addition, there are outlet restrictions, which might forbid a distrib-
utor to sell to any dealer not approved by the manufacturer, or forbid one
dealer to sell ("bootleg") to another dealer, and location clauses, which forbid a
dealer to sell the manufacturer's product at any location other than that speci-
fied in the dealership agreement. Sometimes a manufacturer will reserve certain
large customers to itself, thus eliminating the competition that might otherwise
exist between itself and its dealers. Or it may agree to an exclusive distributor-
ship or dealership, and thereby lose its freedom to authorize additional distribu-
tors or dealers that might compete with the one previously authorized.
Posner, supra note 6, at 6-7.
32. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59. See supra note 3.
33. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
34. See id. at 382. Four years before Schwinn, the Court in White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), stated that it was not sufficiently familiar with verti-
cal nonprice restraints to declare them per se illegal. See id. at 261, 263.
35. See Amicus Brief of the United States at 21-22, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) ("Price-related vertical restrictions in general, and resale price
maintenance in particular, accomplish directly what nonprice vertical restraints accom-
plish indirectly: both types of practice are designed to increase both price and sales
volume.").
36. See Baxter Letter II, supra note 29, reprinted in Scherer, supra note 29, at 718
("In short, the per se rule against [resale price maintenance] goes far to subvert, in prac-
tice, the rule of reason treatment which is, in theory, accorded to all other vertical distri-
bution controls. So long as manufacturers must abide the outcome of trial before juries
... [they] will be strongly deterred not just from entering formal price arrangements,
but from resorting to a wide variety of distribution controls."); see also Cernuto, Inc. v.
United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1979) (nonprice restrictions can
constitute price-fixing and thus be per se illegal); Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doc-
trine and Economics in the Section One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 Va. L.
Rev. 1457, 1463 (1981) ("Because of the enormous attraction of litigating under a per se
rule, virtually every plaintiff now alleges that ... vertical restrictions are intended to
control price."); Posner, supra note 6, at 11 ("Disparate legal treatment of vertical price
and nonprice restrictions may, as a practical matter, often result in the condemnation of
the latter as per se illegal, contrary to the holding of Sylvania.").
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Miles require the application of different standards to indistinguishable
behavior and the Supreme Court should overrule one or the other.
Assuming the cases are not incompatible in practice, the theoretical
question remains: Do vertical restrictions of the price and nonprice vari-
ety generally serve the same purpose and produce the same effect?37 If
so, they ought to be subject to the same legal standard. These questions
implicate the Colgate31 case, which limits the circumstances under which
an agreement to fix resale prices may be inferred.39
I. ARE DPA MILES AND SYLVANIA INCOMPATIBLE IN PRACTICE?
Is it possible to adhere to the principles of both Dr. Miles and Sylva-
nia? In the abstract, the answer is self-evident. Vertical restrictions can
be divided into two categories, those directly affecting price and those
which do not.4 Dr. Miles deals only with the former and Sylvania only
with the latter. An agreement between a manufacturer and a dealer
which imposes a territorial restriction by prohibiting dealer sales outside
a specified geographic area has no direct bearing on the price. Its impact
on price, if any, is indirect. It may reduce or eliminate competition
among dealers handling the manufacturer's product. The degree to
which intrabrand competition is affected depends on the degree of exclu-
sivity granted the dealer. If the territories are not exclusive, intrabrand
competition will be reduced but not eliminated. If each dealer is given an
exclusive territory, intrabrand competition is eliminated, but the impact
on price will depend on the degree of interbrand competition faced by the
dealers.4 A similar agreement providing for resale by the dealer at spec-
ified prices, however, directly affects price and would appear to be readily
distinguishable from any nonprice restriction.
In practice, this bright line between price and nonprice restrictions dis-
appears because there need not be an express agreement for a violation of
the per se rule of Dr. Miles to occur.42 Depending on the standards ap-
plied in determining what evidence will support the inference of a verti-
cal price-fixing agreement, the line between price and nonprice
restrictions may become too blurry.43
37. Compare Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 69 (1977)
(White, J., concurring) ("It is common ground among the leading advocates of a purely
economic approach to the question of distribution restraints that the economic arguments
in favor of allowing vertical nonprice restraints generally apply to vertical price restraints
as well.") with id. at 51 n.18 (pointing out that industry-wide vertical price-fixing might
be used to facilitate cartels, a danger not raised by nonprice vertical restrictions).
38. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
39. See id. at 306-07.
40. See supra notes 3, 31 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
42. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966) ("it has
long been settled that explicit agreement is not a necessary part of a Sherman Act con-
spiracy"); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) ("No formal
agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy.").
43. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Suppose a manufacturer produces widgets packaged for retail sale and
marked with a suggested retail price of ten dollars. The manufacturer
believes it can maximize sales by reducing competition among retailers
and therefore specifies the locations where retailers must sell. The loca-
tions are spaced so that, in the manufacturer's judgment, there will be
little or no competition among retailers in the sale of its widgets. Re-
tailer A charges the suggested price of ten dollars on sales at the location
specified by the manufacturer. He also decides he could make more
money by selling widgets for nine dollars at an unauthorized location in
competition with retailer B. Suppose B complains to the manufacturer.
Can the manufacturer terminate A because A violated the location re-
striction-not because of A's failure to comply with the suggested
price-secure in the knowledge that the termination can be defended
under the rule of reason?" Or would such a termination instead lay the
foundation for a treble damage action based on a per se theory of vertical
price-fixing?
In this context, most would agree with former Assistant Attorney
General Baxter that the per se rule would strongly deter enforcement of
the location restriction. 45 This occurs not merely because the manufac-
turer imposed a location restriction which was violated, but because the
restriction was coupled with a suggested retail price which the retailer
chose to ignore. Thus, there is evidence suggesting the manufacturer was
not totally indifferent concerning retail prices. Had there not been at
least some such evidence, the manufacturer could have been reasonably
certain that the termination would be tested under the rule of reason.
In addition to the manufacturer's right under Sylvania to impose non-
price restrictions subject to the rule of reason,46 the manufacturer has the
further right under United States v. Colgate & Co.47 to suggest resale
prices and to announce in advance that noncomplying retailers will be
terminated." Colgate views this as unilateral action not subject to the
Sherman Act.49 Since unilateral action is not subject to the Sherman Act
and territorial restrictions are subject to the rule of reason, it is arguably
improper to deter the coupling of these practices through threatened ap-
plication of the per se rule.
This argument is disingenuous. The manufacturer's suggestion of a
resale price creates the risk that a price-fixing agreement will be inferred.
This risk would exist regardless of the territorial restrictions. For in-
stance, if there were no territorial or other nonprice restrictions and re-
44. Location restrictions have generally been upheld under a rule of reason analysis.
See, eg., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1136-40 (9th Cir.
1982); Golden Gate Acceptance Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 597 F.2d 676, 680-81
(9th Cir. 1979).
45. See supra note 36.
46. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
47. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).




tailer A were being terminated for failure to meet a sales quota or for any
other business reason, the same risk would exist. The problem then is
not a new one created by the Sylvania decision, but an old one concern-
ing the scope of Colgate and when a vertical agreement concerning price
should be inferred.
Dr. Miles and Sylvania address restrictions reasonably distinguishable
and it is rational to adhere to both decisions. The existing uncertainty
can be attributed directly to Colgate and the distinction of independent
from concerted action. There is an obvious and long recognized tension
between Dr. Miles, which flatly prohibits a manufacturer and its dealers
from agreeing to a resale price, and Colgate, which permits a manufac-
turer to "suggest" a resale price which may be disregarded by dealers
only on pain of termination.5 0
Baxter believes this tension and the resulting ambiguity should be re-
solved by overruling Dr. Miles.5 This would make clear that a manufac-
turer can impose any vertical restraint without fear of a per se violation.
It is also arguable, however, that the law should be clarified by overruling
Colgate. The choice of which case to overrule should be made by exam-
ining the interests served by each. After examining the role of Colgate in
antitrust analysis of vertical price-fixing and its impact on Dr. Miles, this
Article will examine the economic purpose and effect of vertical price-
fixing.
1. THE PURPOSE AND EVOLUTION OF THE COLGATE DOCTRINE
A. The Colgate Case
The foundation for Colgate was laid in Dr. Miles. In explaining why it
is unlawful for a manufacturer to fix retail prices, the Court in Dr. Miles
stated:
If there be an advantage to a manufacturer in the maintenance of fixed
retail prices, the question remains whether it is one which he is entitled
to secure by agreements restricting the freedom of trade on the part of
dealers who own what they sell. As to this, the complainant can fare
no better with its plan of identical contracts than could the dealers
themselves if they formed a combination and endeavored to establish
the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by agree-
50. See United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 264 F. 175, 183 (N.D. Ohio 1919)
("Personally, and with all due respect, permit me to say that I can see no real difference
upon the facts between the Dr. Miles Medical Co. Case and the Colgate Co. Case. The
only difference is that in the former the arrangement for marketing its product was put in
writing, whereas in the latter the wholesale and retail dealers observed the prices fixed by
the vendor. This is a distinction without a difference. The tacit acquiescence of the
wholesalers and retailers in the prices thus fixed is the equivalent for all practical pur-
poses of an express agreement. . . ."), rev'd, 252 U.S. 85 (1920); Calvani & Berg, Resale
Price Maintenance After Monsanto: A Doctrine Still at War with Itself, 1984 Duke LJ.
1163, 1168-69 ("distinction between unilateral action and concerted conduct (is] of un-
certain precedential value").
51. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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ment with each other.
5 2
This language presents two distinct reasons justifying the per se rule
against vertical price-fixing. First, vertical price-fixing restricts dealers'
freedom to trade. 3 Second, it produces uniform pricing among dealers
and thus has the same effect as horizontal price-fixing at the dealer
level.5 4 The opinion is not entirely clear on whether either reason stand-
ing alone would justify condemnation. This point is important because
the reasons suggest different notions concerning the goals of antitrust.
The freedom to trade rationale reflects social or political values as well as
economic ones.55 The horizontal effect rationale reflects only economic
values.16 It is generally recognized that the Sherman Act was intended
to achieve economic goals such as low prices and high output,57 but
sharp disagreement exists concerning whether Congress had additional
objectives.58 Since the Sherman Act is based on the proposition that eco-
nomic goals are most effectively achieved through a competitive system
dependent on free pricing among competitors,5 9 horizontal price-fixing
which eliminates free pricing is appropriately subject to the per se rule.6°
If there were general agreement that vertical price-fixing has the same
purpose and effect as horizontal price-fixing, the rule of Dr. Miles would
52. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 407-08.
53. Elsewhere in the Colgate opinion, the Court stated:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does
not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an
entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance
the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.
Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
54. See supra note 6.
55. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 406.
56. See id. at 408 (result of identical vertical contracts is same as horizontal combina-
tion-uniform prices).
57. See, e.g., R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 90-106
(1978); H. Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law 50-54 (1985).
58. Compare R. Bork, supra note 57, at 90-106 (antitrust laws concerned solely with
economic goals) and Posner, The Chicago School of.Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev.
925, 928, 932-34, 948 (1979) (same) with A. Neale & D. Goyder, The Antitrust Laws of
the U.S.A. 439-43, 470-72 (3d ed. 1980) (an impetus of antitrust law is distrust of power)
and Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of
Law and Economics, 72 Geo. L.J. 1511, 1569-70 (1984) (antitrust law protects pluralism
and protects against concentration of power).
59. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962 n.27 (1984) ("The Sher-
man Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at pre-
serving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material pro-
gress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that premise open to ques-
tion, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.") (quoting Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
60. See H. Hovenkamp, supra note 57, at 91 ("[A]s long as firms are tempted to fix
prices, the strong policy against cartels in the American antitrust laws is a good one.").
See supra note 6.
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not be controversial. Since the two forms of price-fixing are now widely
believed to serve different purposes and to produce different effects, 6 I and
since many believe social or political values have no place in antitrust,62
it is not surprising that Dr. Miles has been questioned.
In Colgate the manufacturer informed its wholesale and retail custom-
ers that it would continue to deal only with those customers who resold
at the established prices.6 3 The Court recognized that:
The retailer, after buying, could, if he chose, give away his purchase, or
sell it at any price he saw fit, or not sell it at all; his course in these
respects being affected only by the fact that he might by his actions
incur the displeasure of the manufacturer, who could refuse to make
further sales to him, as he had the undoubted right to do.64
Dr. Miles was distinguished as involving "contracts which undertook
to prevent dealers from freely exercising the right to sell."' '65 In what have
become household words to antitrust lawyers, the Court announced that:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
[Sherman Act] does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.
And, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under
which he will refuse to sell.66
This result was justified, said the Court, because the "purpose of the
Sherman Act is . . . in a word to preserve the right of freedom to
trade." 67
The freedom to trade concept proved to be a double-edged sword in
Colgate. While it assured the dealer freedom to price goods as he saw fit,
it also assured the manufacturer's right to refuse to deal with distributors
who in the past had declined to price the product in accord with the
manufacturer's expectations. Essentially, the Court was forced to choose
between the two rationales of Dr. Miles. In Dr. Miles, the freedom to
trade and horizontal effect rationales both supported a determination of
illegality.68 In Colgate, the rationales pointed in opposite directions. The
61. See infra Part m.
62. See, eg., R. Bork, supra note 57, at 87-89; Handler, The Twentieth Annual Anti-
trust Review-1967, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1667, 1678-80 (1967); Posner, supra note 6, at 21-22;
see also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) (Free-
dom of trade "is irrelevant to the issue before us: the efrect of the antitrust laws upon
vertical distributional restraints in the American economy today.") (quoting United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 392 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). But
see Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 68 (White, J., concurring) (The freedom of trade "rationale runs
through our case law in the area of distributional restraints.").
63. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 303.
64. Id. at 306 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 253 F. 522, 527 (F.D. Va.
1918), affid, 250 U.S. 300 (1919)).
65. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307-08.
66. Id. at 307.
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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freedom to trade rationale suggested that a manufacturer also should be
free to select with whom it will deal, 69 but the horizontal effect rationale
suggested that customer selection used as a device to bring about uniform
resale pricing undermines intrabrand competition and violates the Sher-
man Act.70 The Colgate court rejected the horizontal effect rationale of
Dr. Miles by ignoring it.71 The manufacturer's refusal to deal with dis-
tributors who, in the past, had not followed suggested retail prices, was
upheld because it involved nothing more than an exercise of the manu-
facturer's freedom to trade.72
Colgate thus elevated noneconomic goals embodied in the freedom to
trade concept over the economic goals of the horizontal effect rationale.
Furthermore, Colgate is based on an extremely formalistic distinction
amounting to the following: If a dealer bought one hundred widgets
from a manufacturer and agreed to resell them at ten dollars each, the
agreement infringed his freedom to trade and violated the Sherman Act
under Dr. Miles. If the same dealer purchased one hundred widgets be-
ing informed by the manufacturer of a suggested resale price of ten dol-
lars and being further informed that the manufacturer would not sell
additional widgets to the dealer if the suggested price were not followed,
then, under Colgate, the dealer's freedom to trade was not infringed and
no violation occurred. It does not matter that the dealer will resell the
widgets at ten dollars only because he wishes to buy additional widgets
from the manufacturer.
B. Interpreting Colgate
Not surprisingly, Colgate created confusion. One interpretation, that
Dr. Miles barred only express agreements fixing resale prices, was
promptly rejected by the Supreme Court.73 Once it was clear that Dr.
Miles applied to implied agreements despite Colgate, attention was fo-
cused on what kind of evidence would support a finding of an implied
agreement.
The issue was first addressed in FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. 74
Beech-Nut issued lists of suggested retail prices for wholesalers and re-
tailers.75 To secure compliance, it refused to deal with noncomplying
customers and requested that complying customers not resell to them.76
Furthermore, a customer that had been terminated for failure to resell at
suggested price would be reinstated after giving adequate assurance to
69. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307 (The Sherman Act "does not restrict the long recog-
nized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.").
70. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
71. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 306-07.
72. See id. at 307.
73. See Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 210 (1921).
74. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
75. Id. at 447.
76. Id. at 447-48.
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Beech-Nut that future sales would be at the suggested prices.'
The lower court held the Beech-Nut practice consistent with the policy
of the Sherman Act,7" reasoning that, as in Colgate, wholesalers and re-
tailers were free to sell their goods at any price they chose, subject only to
the possibility of termination if they failed to sell at the suggested
prices.79 The Supreme Court reversed, observing: "The facts found
show that the Beech-Nut system goes far beyond the simple refusal to
sell goods to persons who will not sell at stated prices, which in the Col-
gate Case was held to be within the legal right of the producer."' Beech-
Nut thus confined the shelter of Colgate to mere refusals to deal. If the
manufacturer went further and enlisted wholesalers or retailers to aid in
enforcing suggested resale prices or solicited assurances of compliance,
an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act would be inferred. In lim-
iting Colgate, the Beech-Nut Court observed that under the Beech-Nut
plan, "competition among retail distributors is practically suppressed; for
all who would deal in the company's products are constrained to sell at
the suggested prices.""1 Thus, the Court may be viewed as having done
either or both of two things. It may have balanced the manufacturer's
freedom to trade against the distributor's freedom to trade and con-
cluded that once the manufacturer passes beyond a mere refusal to deal,
his conduct should be characterized as an impermissible infringement on
the distributor's freedom. Alternatively, the case can be viewed as revi-
talizing the horizontal effect rationale of Dr. Miles. 2 Under this second
view, the Court found the horizontal effect rationale of Dr. Miles more
persuasive than the freedom to trade rationale, and Colgate was limited
to its special facts.83
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. " involved facts similar to those of
Beech-Nut. Parke, Davis published suggested retail prices for wholesal-
ers and retailers and announced a policy of selling only to customers who
resold at the suggested prices.8" It also told wholesalers that it would
refuse to sell to those who sold Parke, Davis products to noncomplying
77. Id. at 449.
78. See Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 885, 889 (2d Cir. 1920), rey'd, 257
U.S. 441 (1922). The Beech-Nut selling system was challenged as an unfair method of
competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1982), on the theory that any practice contrary to the policy of the Sherman Act
was subject to condemnation under Section 5 of the FTC Act. See Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. at
453-54.
79. Beech-Nut, 264 F. at 891-92.
80. Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. at 454.
81. Id. at 455.
82. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
83. Although the record in Colgate indicated that it too had received assurances of
compliance from wholesale and retail customers, see Colgate, 250 U.S. at 303, the Court
in Beech-Nut explained that the Colgate decision was based on the district court's con-
struction of the indictment to accuse the manufacturer merely of refusing to deal. See
Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. at 451-52.
84. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
85. Id. at 31-32.
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retailers.86 The wholesalers indicated a willingness to comply, as did at
least one retailer.87 The district court found no violation of the Sherman
Act because Parke, Davis' actions "were properly unilateral" under
Colgate.88
In reversing, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Beech-Nut, observ-
ing that the situation there bore a "marked resemblance to the Parke,
Davis program." 9 In explaining the scope of Colgate, the Parke, Davis
Court stated that Colgate teaches
that judicial inquiry is not to stop with a search of the record for evi-
dence of purely contractual arrangements. The Sherman Act forbids
combinations of traders to suppress competition. True, there results
the same economic effect as is accomplished by a prohibited combina-
tion to suppress price competition if each customer, although induced
to do so solely by a manufacturer's announced policy, independently
decides to observe specified resale prices. So long as Colgate is not
overruled, this result is tolerated but only when it is the consequence of
a mere refusal to sell in the exercise of the manufacturer's right "freely
to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal."' 90
This language suggested a distinction between an agreement, 91 express or
implied, and a combination to fix resale prices. While the significance of
this distinction is not entirely clear,92 it was clear after Parke, Davis, if
86. Id. at 33.
87. Id. at 33, 35.
88. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 164 F. Supp. 827, 829 (1958), rev'd, 362
U.S. 29 (1960).
89. See Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 40.
90. Id. at 44 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) involved a marketing
arrangement similar to that of Beech-Nut. Bausch & Lomb manufactured lenses for sale
to Soft-Lite Lens Company which in turn sold to wholesalers throughout the country.
Id. at 710. Soft-Lite published a list of wholesale prices and did not deal with wholesalers
who deviated from the list price. Id. at 715. Copies of the list were provided to retailers
approved by Soft-Lite who also were subject to resale price restrictions. Id. at 715. In
finding an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act, the Court stated: "As in the
Beech-Nut case, there is more here than mere acquiescence of wholesalers in Soft-Lite's
published resale price list. The wholesalers accepted Soft-Lite's proffer of a plan of distri-
bution by cooperating in prices, limitation of sales to and approval of retail licensees.
That is sufficient." Id. at 723.
91. A bilateral agreement in the context of contract law generally requires that each
party promise performance and thereby create in the other party a right to such perform-
ance. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 2-14, at 54 (2d ed. 1977). In
the context of vertical price-fixing this would occur if, in consideration for the manufac-
turer's promise to sell, a dealer made an express or implied promise to resell at a specified
price.
92. Perhaps the Court meant the term "contract" in Section I should be construed in
light of the purpose of the Sherman Act rather than according to principles of contract
law. Compare Baker, supra note 36, at 1482 (Sherman Act need not follow contract law
in definition of "agreement") with Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sher-
man Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 686-87
(1962) (criticism of Court's interpretation of "agreement" requirement because it makes
no sense under contract law).
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not before,93 that the Court reversed the relative importance of the free-
dom to trade and horizontal effect rationales under Colgate, leaving no
doubt that if it were writing on a clean slate Colgate would not be fol-
lowed. It accomplished this by limiting Colgate to situations in which a
manufacturer announces a policy of selling only to customers who com-
ply with suggested resale prices, and compliance occurs in response to
such announcement.94 Inference of a combination from these facts
would have overruled Colgate. Unwilling to go that far, the Court held
that if customers are unresponsive to the announcement, the manufac-
turer may decline to make further sales but may do nothing more to
achieve compliance.9"
Eight years later, the Court, in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,96 addressed
whether a newspaper publisher engaged in vertical price-fixing by termi-
nating a distributor who charged more than the maximum prices an-
nounced by the publisher.97 The Court found a combination among the
publisher, a third party whom the publisher had hired to solicit custom-
ers served by the noncomplying distributor, and another third party who
replaced the noncomplying distributor.9 Both third parties, the Court
observed, were aware that they were engaged by the publisher in order to
force the distributor to comply with the publisher's suggested price and
were therefore part of an unlawful combination.99 The Court added that
even if no third parties had been involved,
[u]nder Parke Davis, [the distributor] could have claimed a combi-
nation between [the publisher] and himself, at least as of the day he
unwillingly complied with [the publisher's] advertised price. Likewise,
he might successfully have claimed that [the publisher] had combined
with other carriers because the firmly enforced price policy applied to
all carriers, most of whom acquiesced in it.1 °o
93. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
94. See Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 44.
95. Id.
96. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
97. Id. at 151-53.
98. Drawing on Parke, Davis the Court stated:
On the undisputed facts ... respondent's conduct cannot be deemed wholly
unilateral and beyond the reach of § I of the Sherman Act. That section covers
combinations in addition to contracts and conspiracies, express or implied. The
Court made this quite clear in United States v. Parke, Davis and Co., where it
held that an illegal combination to fix prices results if a seller suggests resale
prices and secures compliance by means in addition to the "mere announcement
of his policy and the simple refusal to deal .... " Parke, Davis had specified
resale prices for both wholesalers and retailers and had required wholesalers to
refuse to deal with noncomplying retailers. It was found to have created a com-
bination "with retailers and the wholesalers to maintain retail prices. . . ." The
combination with retailers arose because their acquiescence in the suggested
prices was secured by threats of termination; the combination with wholesalers
arose because they cooperated in terminating price-cutting retailers.
Id. at 149 (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 147-48.
100. Id. at 150 n.6. Similar dicta appeared in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
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This language seems to go beyond Parke, Davis by allowing a fact-
finder to infer from an announced termination policy that a dealer has
been coerced into complying with suggested prices. Coerced compliance
was viewed as concerted rather than independent action and thus pro-
duced the necessary combination.10 1 This theory of combination was
applied in Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc. 102 The plaintiff, a filling station opera-
tor who had been terminated by Texaco, testified that the Texaco sales
supervisor told him at least ten times during 1971: "Either drop the
price or we are going to get a replacement for you."' 3 In upholding
judgment for the plaintiff, the Second Circuit stated: "Texaco went be-
yond Colgate's safe harbor of announcement plus mere refusal to deal by
creating a coercive business climate in which its dealers knew of the low
price policy, understood the consequences of failure to comply and thus
generally complied."'" Significantly, Yentsch involved more than mere
announcement and termination. Through repeated threats of termina-
tion Texaco had created a "coercive business climate."
In Russell Stover Candies, Inc.," the Commission took the step pre-
saged by the dicta of Albrecht. It held that Russell Stover violated the
Sherman Act because its announced policy of not dealing with purchas-
ers who failed to comply with suggested resale prices led to coerced com-
pliance and thus to a vertical price-fixing agreement.10 6 It stated:
We conclude that the Colgate doctrine as it stands today does not pre-
clude, as a matter of law, a finding of agreement when a buyer unwill-
ingly complies with the supplier's pricing policies in order to avoid
termination. There is no basis, either in legal precedent or theory, for
reaching the illogical result that his conduct is only unilateral.'0 7
Although the Commission's decision was reversed by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit,'0 8 these post-Parke, Davis decisions raised
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), where a dealer claimed certain restrictive
franchise agreements violated Section 1. Id. at 142. The Court stated:
In any event each (dealer] can clearly charge a combination between Midas
[the supplier] and himself, as of the day he unwillingly complied with the re-
strictive franchise agreements, or between Midas and other franchise dealers,
whose acquiescence in Midas' firmly enforced restraints was induced by "the
communicated danger of termination,"....
Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
101. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 149.
102. 630 F.2d 46, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1980).
103. Id. at 50.
104. Id. at 53.
105. 1979-1983 Trade Reg. Repts. (CCH) 21, 933 (July 1, 1982), rev'd sub nom.
Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).
106. See id. at 22,369.
107. Id.
108. See Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983). The court
stated:
It may be that . . Albrecht foreshadows the Supreme Court's overruling of
Colgate or it may be, as the Commission suggests, that the Court has already
confined Colgate to willing compliance with suggested prices and to initial cus-
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serious questions concerning Colgate. The Supreme Court in Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., however, showed renewed interest in
the vitality of Colgate.
C. The Monsanto Case
Spray-Rite sued under the Sherman Act after having been terminated
as a distributor of Monsanto products. 110 Prior to the termination Mon-
santo had received complaints from other distributors concerning Spray-
Rite's failure to comply with Monsanto's suggested prices.'' The case
was tried to a jury which found that Monsanto and the complaining dis-
tributors had agreed to fix the resale price of Monsanto products and the
termination occurred pursuant to that agreement.112 Spray-Rite was
awarded treble damages of $10.5 million.113 The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed," 4 observing that the record clearly estab-
lished numerous complaints from competing distributors about Spray-
Rite's price-cutting practices."' Although the circuits were divided on
whether evidence of price complaints coupled with termination in re-
sponse to those complaints would support the inference of a resale price
maintenance agreement," 6 the Seventh Circuit held such evidence
sufficient.
17
tomer selection. However, courts continue to cite Colgate .... If Colgate no
longer stands for the proposition that a "simple refusal to sell to customers who
will not sell at prices suggested by the seller is permissible under the Sherman
Act,"... it is for the Supreme Court, not this court, to so declare.
Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
109. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
110. Id. at 757.
Although Monsanto merely failed to renew Spray-Rite's distributorship, the Seventh
Circuit treated the failure to renew as termination. See Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Mon-
santo Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1233 n.2 (7th Cir. 1982), afr'd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
111. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 757.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 758.
114. Id.
115. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1238-39 (7th Cir. 1982),
affd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984). The Seventh Circuit conditioned its affirmation on Spray-
Rite's acceptance of a remittur of $172,412. See id. at 1243-44.
116. Compare Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1199 (6th
Cir. 1982) (insufficient), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984), Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 677 F.2d 946, 952-53 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982), Roesch,
Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F.2d 1168, 1171-72 (8th Cir. 1982) (same), aff'd on rehear-
ing by an equally divided court, 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 926 (1984), Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840, 845 (10th Cir. 1981) (same) and
Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 110 (3rd Cir. 1980)
(same), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981) with Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702
F.2d 1207, 1215-16 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983) (sufficient) and Battle v.
Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931
(1984).
117. See Monsanto, 684 F.2d at 1238. There was some ambiguity in the Seventh Cir-
cuit's opinion on whether the evidentiary standard for finding concerted action required
proof of termination in response to competing distributors' complaints, see id. at 1239, or
merely that termination followed such complaints, see id. at 1239. On review, the
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On review, the Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's standard
of proof but affirmed the judgmentI 8 because the evidence satisfied the
more stringent standard adopted by the Court.1 19 The Court stated:
[I]t is of considerable importance that independent action by the man-
ufacturer, and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distin-
guished from price-fixing agreements, since under present law the
latter are subject to per se treatment and treble damages .... If an
inference of [a vertical price-fixing] agreement may be drawn from
highly ambiguous evidence, there is a considerable danger that the
doctrines enunciated in Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously
eroded. 120
Evidence of price complaints, or even of termination "in response to"
complaints was viewed as ambiguous because such complaints are natu-
ral reactions by distributors to the activities of rivals.12 ' To preclude a
dealer termination merely because the manufacturer is acting on infor-
mation which originated as a price complaint "would create an irrational
dislocation in the market." 122 Presumably this is because the mere fact
that termination is based on information received through dealer com-
plaints does not negate the possibility, indeed the probability, that the
manufacturer is freely choosing to terminate the price cutter in its own
self-interest rather than acquiescing in the request for help implicit in the
complaints. Manufacturers ought to be free to make unilateral business
decisions based on relevant economic data regardless of its source.
Stated affirmatively, the Monsanto standard requires the plaintiff to
present evidence which reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer
and complaining dealers "had a conscious commitment to a common
scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective."' 123 While evidence of
dealer complaints has probative value, there must be evidence which
"tends to exclude the possibility of independent action by the manufac-
turer." 24 In other words, the evidence must show that the manufacturer
was not making a unilateral decision about how to effectively distribute
its product, but instead was carrying out the termination because of its
agreement with complaining dealers. In Monsanto, this was shown by
evidence that Monsanto had approached two price-cutting dealers and
advised that if they deviated from suggested prices they would not re-
ceive adequate supplies.' 25 At least one dealer informed Monsanto it
Supreme Court noted the distinction and concluded that it was "not ultimately signifi-
cant." Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 758 n.4.
118. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763. Justice White did not participate in the decision. Id.
at 769. Justice Brennan concurred in the opinion. Id.
119. Id. at 765.
120. Id. at 762-63.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 764.
123. Id. (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 765.
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would comply. 26 "Evidence of this kind," said the Court, "plainly is
relevant and persuasive as to a meeting of the minds.""12 Other evidence
considered by the Court included a newsletter from a distributor to his
dealer-customers which stated:
[W]e are assured that Monsanto's company-owned outlets will not re-
tail at less than their suggested retail price to the trade as a whole.
Furthermore, those of us on the distributor level are not likely to devi-
ate downward on price to anyone as the idea is implied that doing this
possibly could discolor the outlook for continuity as one of the ap-
proved distributors during the future upcoming seasons.128
This newsletter, the Court concluded, could be viewed as referring to
an agreement that Monsanto would not undercut retail prices and would
terminate customers who did.129
Mere action and reaction in the form of suggested prices and voluntary
dealer compliance will not support an inference of concerted action
under any of the decided cases. Similarly, Monsanto holds that action
and reaction will not support an inference of concerted action where the
roles are reversed, that is, where action is by the dealers in the form of
complaints concerning prices charged by a competing dealer, and reac-
tion is by the manufacturer in the form of terminating the target of the
complaints. Here too there must be some additional evidence tending to
exclude the possibility of independent action.
This appears to be a logical and proper application of the Section 1
contract requirement. 130 A manufacturer can suggest resale prices and
in response dealers can voluntarily comply without creating the risk of a
per se violation. It logically follows that termination in response to
dealer complaints should be viewed similarly. In either case, the reaction
could plausibly be attributable to an independent choice. Of course, it is
equally plausible that the action-reaction was consensual and that the
reaction constituted an assent to the request implicit in the action and
thus there was a meeting of the minds.131 So long as either explanation is
plausible, the inference of concerted action is speculative and it is appro-
priate to require additional evidence. The additional evidence which sat-
isfied the court in Monsanto was similar to that involved in Yentsch v.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 766.
129. Id. Monsanto subsequently wrote the distributor who had authored the newslet-
ter urging him to "correct immediately any misconceptions about Monsanto's marketing
policies," and disavowing any intent to enter into an agreement on resale prices. Id. at
766-67 n.1l. Whether this evidence should give rise to the inference of an agreement, the
Court said, was properly left to the jury. Id.
130. See supra note 4.
131. In Monsanto, the Court quoted with approval from an earlier decision: "[Circum-
stances must reveal] a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a
meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement." Id. at 764 (quoting American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)).
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Texaco132 and other pre-Monsanto cases. 133 The Monsanto Court ob-
served in a footnote that "[tihe jury could have concluded that Monsanto
sought this agreement [to comply with suggested prices] at a time when it
was able to use supply as a lever to force compliance."' 34 At the same
time it flatly stated that under Colgate "a distributor is free to acquiesce
in the manufacturer's demand [concerning resale prices] in order to
avoid termination."13 5 Thus the Court retained the fine, perhaps mean-
ingless, distinction of earlier decisions that allows dealer compliance
brought about by the manufacturer's announcement of a termination pol-
icy but disallows dealer compliance brought about through threats of ter-
mination or other coercive practices.
136
The Monsanto decision may lead to a new equally fine distinction. Ar-
guably, termination in response to dealer complaints should support an
inference of concerted action when it occurs in the context of suggested
resale prices coupled with an announced refusal to sell to noncomplying
dealers. Although suggested prices were involved in Monsanto, there was
no announced policy of terminating noncomplying dealers. 137 The Court
may have rejected the Seventh Circuit's standard of proof because it ap-
plied regardless of an announced termination policy. 13
While the Monsanto Court did not explicitly recognize this distinction,
it is entirely consistent with what the court did say: "'[T]o permit the
inference of concerted action on the basis of receiving complaints alone
and thus to expose the [manufacturer] to treble damage liability would
both inhibit management's exercise of independent business judgment
and emasculate the terms of the [Act].' ... Thus something more than
evidence of complaints is needed."' 39 The manufacturer's initial sugges-
tion of resale prices coupled with an announced termination policy
should satisfy this "something more" requirement. A three-step scenario
which involves (1) the manufacturer's announcement that it will not sell
to dealers who fail to sell at the suggested price, (2) dealer complaints of
noncompliance by other dealers and (3) termination of noncomplying
dealers, indicates "a unity of purpose or a common design and under-
132. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
134. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 765 n.10.
135. Id. at 761.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
137. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 756-57, 765-66.
138. In one case cited by the Monsanto Court, an agreement was inferred from evi-
dence of termination in response to dealer complaints even in the absence of manufac-
turer suggested prices. See id. at 759 n.5 (citing Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984,
990-92 (8th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 466 U.S. 93 (1984)). The Court's failure to consider
the possibility that Monsanto adopted an unannounced, but well known termination pol-
icy is not surprising, because there was stronger evidence of concerted action. Not only
did Monsanto suggest resale prices, it met with dealers and secured assurances of compli-
ance. Id. at 765.
139. Id. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111
n.2 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
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standing, or a meeting of minds,"' 4 which makes unilateral action un-
likely if not totally implausible. 4 1 Allowing the inference of an
agreement from these facts should create little risk that truly independ-
ent action would be erroneously characterized as concerted. Risk of er-
ror led the Monsanto Court to rule as it did. 42 Where the risk does not
exist, or is relatively minor, the Monsanto decision should not preclude
inferring an agreement.
Viewed this way, Monsanto falls into the pattern of prior Supreme
Court decisions interpreting Colgate.1 43  There is a suggestion in the
Monsanto opinion, however, that the Court intended to break rather than
continue that pattern. The Court expressed concern that under the evi-
dentiary standard applied by the lower court, the "doctrines enunciated
in Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously eroded." 1" This sharply con-
trasts with the statement in Parke, Davis that
[s]o long as Colgate is not overruled, [resale price maintenance induced
by a manufacturer's announced policy] is tolerated but only when it is
the consequence of a mere refusal to sell in the exercise of the manufac-
turer's right "freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal." 145
Eroding Colgate to strengthen the per se rule of Dr. Miles was viewed as
appropriate in Parke, Davis; in Monsanto it was not. This suggests
that the foregoing interpretation of Monsanto may be unpersuasive and
the decision in fact signals a new and expansive view of Colgate which,
according to the Court in Monsanto, is necessary to preserve the integrity
of the price/nonprice distinction recognized in Sylvania. 47
D. Colgate and the Price/Nonprice Vertical Restriction Distinction
In light of Colgate's progeny, the Monsanto Court correctly empha-
sized the need to clarify the distinction between independent and con-
certed action. 48 It also correctly emphasized the significance of the
distinction between price and nonprice vertical restrictions, 4 9 because
under Sylvania, per se treatment applies to the former but not the lat-
140. Id. (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)).
141. In elaborating on its standard of proof the Court said: "It means... that evi-
dence must be presented both that the distributor communicated its acquiescence or
agreement, and that this was sought by the manufacturer." Id. at 810 n.9. Announce-
ment of a termination policy clearly communicates to dealers the manufacturer's desire
for resale price uniformity. A complaint from a complying dealer concerning noncompli-
ance by another dealer clearly communicates the dealer's acquiescence.
142. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part II.B.
144. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763.
145. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
147. 465 U.S. at 763.
148. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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ter. 5 ' The Court failed, however, to distinguish the agreement issue
from the characterization issue. Colgate involved an issue anterior to the
price/nonprice distinction. Only after it is determined that concerted ac-
tion exists does the question of its character as a price or nonprice restric-
tion arise.
Once the agreement issue is isolated from the characterization issue,
Colgate is readily seen as incompatible with Sylvania. Sylvania criticized
earlier decisions based on abstract formal distinctions rather than eco-
nomic realities.15" ' Colgate conditions application of Section 1 on just
such a distinction: A manufacturer may refuse to sell to a dealer who
fails to follow suggested prices, but may not sell to a dealer on condition
that the dealer resell at specified prices. Few would argue that this dis-
tinction is based on economic or business realities that justify withhold-
ing or applying Section 1 liability, or that it clarifies the distinction
between independent and concerted action. Furthermore, Colgate was
based on the freedom to trade notion,152 a discredited theory which, ac-
cording to Sylvania, should be preempted as a factor in antitrust analysis
by a market impact test.'5 3 Colgate has never made sense except as a
device for contracting and expanding the rule of Dr. Miles, 5 4 and has
obfuscated rather than clarified the question of what constitutes con-
certed action. The Monsanto Court could have substantially clarified the
distinction between, independent and concerted action by overruling
Colgate.
Why did it instead express concern for the erosion of Colgate? Per-
haps the answer lies in the Court's obvious disenchantment with the per
se rule of Dr. Miles.' The temptation to narrow the scope of Dr. Miles
by expanding Colgate may seem irresistible. That cannot be done, how-
ever, without eroding Section l's application to nonprice restrictions, i.e.,
without eroding Sylvania. For example, under an expansive reading of
Colgate a supplier could avoid the rule of reason which Sylvania applies
to territorial restrictions by suggesting dealers confine their sales to speci-
fied territories, by announcing its intentions to terminate dealers not
complying with such restrictions and by terminating noncomplying deal-
ers in response to complaints from complying dealers. Conduct which in
reality may well involve an agreed-on nonprice restriction and therefore
150. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
151. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52-54 (1977).
152. See supra text accompanying note 13.
153. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-58; see also Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762 ("the legality
of arguably anticompetitive conduct should be judged primarily by its market impact").
154. This point can be readily grasped if one assumes vertical price-fixing is as damag-
ing to competition as horizontal price-fixing. Plainly, Colgate would provide a means for
circumventing the rule and would therefore not be tolerated.
Concerning the distinction between vertical price and nonprice restrictions the Mon-
santo Court stated: "[T]he economic effect of all of the conduct described above-unilat-
eral and concerted vertical price-setting, agreements on price and nonprice restrictions-
is in many, but not all, cases similar or identical." Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762.
155. See id. at 761-62.
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ought to be subject to the market impact test, as a matter of law is re-
garded as independent action free from the constraints of Section 1.
A more likely explanation is that when the Monsanto Court expressed
concern about the erosion of Colgate it simply wished to emphasize that
concerted action is central to Section 1 analysis and should not be lightly
inferred. In this context it meant concerted action should not be lightly
inferred from a manufacturer's mere suggestion of a resale price, dealer
complaints, and a responsive termination. The opinion contains support
for this interpretation: "To bar a manufacturer from acting solely be-
cause the information upon which it acts originated as a price complaint
would create an irrational dislocation of the market."'' 5 6
Once a vertical agreement is found, its characterization as a price or
nonprice restriction is problematic only if Dr. Miles is of questionable
validity. Although there is always some risk a nonprice agreement will
be erroneously characterized as a price agreement, that does not mean
the distinction should be abandoned. For example, even though an
agreement among competitors to exchange price information may erro-
neously be characterized as a horizontal price-fixing agreement, that risk
of error has not led the Court to adopt a special evidentiary standard for
finding an agreement in this context or to abandon the per se rule.""7
The benefits associated with the per se rule against horizontal price-fixing
justify the costs associated with the risk of error."'8
The same analysis applies to vertical agreements. If Dr. Miles is right,
i.e., if vertical price-fixing, like horizontal price-fixing, is nearly always
anticompetitive, the risk that some nonprice vertical restrictions may be
deterred is acceptable. If incorrect it should be overruled rather than
artificially narrowed through Colgate's evidentiary standard exalting
form over substance. As the Court has recognized at least since Parke.
Davis, the fate of Dr. Miles should depend on the economic effect of verti-
cal price-fixing."5 9 As in other contexts, purpose occupies a prominent
role in the determination of probable effect."6° Thus, the question
156. Id. at 1470.
157. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
158. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 n.16 ("Per se rules thus require the Court to make
broad generalizations about the social utility of particular commercial practices. The
probability that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity
of those consequences must be balanced against its procompetitive consequences. Cases
that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects the judgment that
such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense nec-
essary to identify them."); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 213
(1940) ("Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in them-
selves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry
whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on
the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to
day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic condi-
tions.") (quoting United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927)).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
160. In Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), the Court rejected the
government's argument that every agreement affecting price is per se unlawful, observing:
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whether Dr. Miles should be overruled because it is inconsistent with the
market impact test of Sylvania should turn on the economic purpose and
effect of vertical price-fixing.16 Freedom to trade is not relevant to de-
termining market impact 162 and thus should not be considered in evalu-
ating Dr. Miles.
III. THE ECONOMIC PURPOSE AND EFFECT
OF VERTICAL PRICE-FIXING
The economic justification most commonly advanced in support of
vertical restrictions, price and nonprice alike, is the "free rider" prob-
lem. 163 A manufacturer may wish to encourage dealers to promote its
product and provide services designed to maximize consumer satisfac-
tion. A dealer will hesitate to provide such promotion and services if a
competing dealer can avoid the cost of providing them, sell at a lower
price and take a "free ride." Personal computers provide an apt exam-
ple. 164 Most prospective consumers have at best a hazy notion of what a
personal computer can do and how it can serve their needs. Educating
the consumer may require a substantial investment of time by an articu-
late well-trained salesperson. A dealer will not long maintain a sales staff
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
161. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978) (The Court concluded the rule of reason applies when "competitive effect can only
be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint,
and the reasons why it was imposed .... mhe purpose of the analysis is to form a
judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint.. ").
162. See Note, The Resale Price Maintenance Compromise: A Presumption of Illegality,
38 Vand. L. Rev. 163, 165 (1985) (The continuance of the rule of Dr. Miles "rest[s] on the
principles of stare decisis and, therefore, do[es] not depend upon political and economic
theories that have developed since Dr. Miles.") (footnotes omitted). See supra notes 152-
54 and accompanying text.
163. Professor Telser phrased the problem as follows:
Sales are diverted from the retailers who do provide the special services at the
higher price to the retailers who do not provide the special services and offer to
sell the product at the lower price. The mechanism is simple. A customer,
because of the special services provided by one retailer, is persuaded to buy the
product. But he purchases the product from another paying the latter a lower
price. In this way the retailers who do not provide the special services get a free
ride at the expense of those who have convinced consumers to buy the product.
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ. 86, 91 (1960). For
additional descriptions of the problems, see Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1984); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55
(1977); R. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 147-49 (1976); Baker, supra
note 36, at 1467; Posner, supra note 6, at 9.
164. See Calvani & Berg, supra note 50, at 1182 n.69. But see Scherer, supra note 29,
at 694 (asking how much customer service is necessary to sell light bulbs, clothing, liquor
and candy). For other examples of possible free riding, see Calvani & Berg, supra note
50, at 1181-82 & n. 69 (stereos and furniture).
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capable of providing this service if consumers can come to him for infor-
mation, then walk across the street and buy from another dealer at a
lower price made possible by the second dealer's failure to provide simi-
lar services.
The manufacturer's interest in preventing free riding through vertical
price-fixing is considered legitimate because it is designed not to increase
price to the ultimate consumer, but to increase output.' 65 If the manu-
facturer were interested only in increasing price, it could do so by raising
its price to the dealers.166 What it really wants is to increase output with-
out lowering its price to dealers, and it hopes to do this by encouraging
the dealers to provide services even though such services will raise the
retail price. Essentially, the manufacturer believes that the demand cre-
ated for its product through the rendition of dealer services will more
than offset the decrease in demand resulting from a higher uniform retail
price.167 If this is true, providing dealer services promotes allocative effi-
ciency because it generates greater demand than the corresponding in-
crease in price chokes off. If the manufacturer is wrong, demand for its
product will fall rather than rise as consumers switch to competing
brands in response to the uniform retail price, and the manufacturer will
be forced to reduce the retail price. Loss of sales in a competitive market
will force the manufacturer to correct his error.
Thus vertical price-fixing seems to pose little competitive danger. If
the manufacturer's judgment is correct, it is efficient and compatible with
the goals of competition; if it is incorrect it cannot be sustained so long as
there is interbrand competition. Interbrand competition provides the
crucial distinction between vertical restraints on the one hand, and hori-
zontal restraints on the others, which have as their purpose the elimina-
tion of interbrand competition."6 8
Suppose, however, that the increased volume brought about by in-
creased dealer services coupled with a higher retail price brings no new
consumers into the market but simply shifts consumers from other
brands. Now, the manufacturer's decision to increase volume through
vertical price-fixing and greater dealer services has a twofold impact on
interbrand competition. First, it takes sales away from other manufac-
turers. Second, it causes other manufacturers to respond. Because other
manufacturers are selling in the same retail market, they are likely to
respond similarly, that is, by imposing resale prices and inducing their
dealers to provide additional services. If this reaction spreads through-
out the market, consumers will lose the option of educating themselves
and purchasing at a lower price as an alternative to purchasing from a
dealer who offers educational services coupled with a higher price. Once
165. See Calvani & Berg, supra note 50, at 1182.
166. See Calvani & Berg, supra note 50, at 1180; Baxter Letter I, supra note 27, re-
printed in 1983 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,442, at 56,007.
167. See Telser, supra note 163, at 89-92.
168. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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vertical price-fixing becomes standard practice in the industry, inter-
brand competition may not effectively check manufacturer error. 69
If vertical price-fixing is not a standard practice in the industry, its
ability to deter free riding is reduced. Much of the information provided
by a dealer handling brand X may be applicable to brand Y, enabling the
latter to take a free ride on educational services provided by the former.
Thus, despite the emphasis free riding has received in the economic liter-
ature and in recent decisions, 170 its actual role in vertical price-fixing is
speculative. '71 Indeed Telser, who first developed the free rider the-
ory,172 acknowledged that while it provides a rational explanation for
resale price maintenance, its actual significance has not been established
through empirical evidence and is unknown. 173 If the free rider theory is
not in fact the explanation, Telser concluded, then the explanation for
manufacturer-induced resale price-fixing must rest in a producers'
cartel.174
A producers' cartel which wishes to establish a uniform price must
confront the problem of cheating. 175 All producers may agree that the
uniform wholesale price should be ten dollars per unit, but if a given
producer can profitably sell at nine dollars the temptation to increase
sales by secretly lowering the price may prove irresistible. However, if
the cartel further agrees to fix the retail price at say fourteen dollars per
169. See Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork on Price Fixing, 76 Yale L.J. 722, 724 (1967)
(If all or most manufacturers use resale price maintenance, "the competitive sales-in-
creasing effect would be neutralized; and, other things being equal, total sales would be
smaller."); Scherer, supra note 29, at 703 ("When one looks at a single manufacturer
imposing vertical restraints upon its distributors in a way that maximizes the distributor's
profits, then one can infer from the fact that output has increased, that efficiency is likely
to have increased. If, on the other hand, you get a race among numerous rivalrous manu-
facturers to raise margins and increase the level of non-price competition, then the results
are ambiguous. It may well be that efficiency has increased: that the gain to consumers
outweighs the additional cost. But it can go the other way too: the cost of the restraints
can exceed the gain to consumers."). But see Bork, A Reply to Professors Gould and
Yamey, 76 Yale L.J. 731, 733 (1967) (in order to reap greater profits, some manufacturers
will not require services).
170. See supra note 163 and infra note 171.
171. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 28, at 747; Fitzgerald, Antitrust, Discounting, and
RPM in the Sporting-Goods Industry: A "Chicago" Reply to Professor Baxter, 14 Anti-
trust L. & Econ. Rev., No. 3, 43, 68-70 (1982); Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The
No-Frills Case for a PerSe Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1492-93
(1983); Scherer, supra note 29, at 694-95; Wysocki, Resale Price Maintenance and the
Mass Market: A 'Repeat Business' Rebuttal to Professor Baxter, 14 Antitrust L. & Econ.
Rev., No. 3, 91, 99 (1982). But see Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55 (Court considered free rider
theory in overruling Schwinn's rule of per se illegality for nonprice vertical restrictions).
172. See Telser, supra note 163.
173. See id. at 104.
174. See id. at 105 (last paragraph).
175. Members of a cartel have an incentive to cheat on the cartel by selling below the
agreed price, thereby increasing sales. See Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744
F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984); Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 27
(1984); Comment, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the Boundary, 52 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 508, 511 (1985).
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unit, the incentive to cheat might be removed. Retail prices are known to
the public. If a producer wishes to cheat on the cartel price, it still can-
not allow its retailers to reduce the retail price from fourteen dollars to
thirteen dollars since the lower retail price would soon be detected by
other members of the cartel. Lowering the wholesale price would be
pointless unless the resulting increase in the dealer's margin will cause
dealers to sell more of the price cutting manufacturer's products and thus
increase sales volume. According to Telser, the cartel may avoid this
possibility by selling through exclusive distributorships: "Thus each dis-
tributor becomes an exclusive dealer in one brand and cannot favor one
manufacturer at the expense of another." ' 6 But, even with exclusive
dealerships, dealers might be induced through greater profit margins to
render greater promotional services, and thus increase sales at the ex-
pense of other manufacturers.
Clearly, Telser's explanations left some important questions unan-
swered. He did not try to argue that free riding is in fact an explanation
for resale price maintenance, but simply advanced the theory as a plausi-
ble explanation. The alternate explanation of retail price maintenance as
a device to enforce a producers' cartel left open the possibility that a
producer might nonetheless wish to cheat on the cartel because increased
dealer services would presumably stimulate demand and thus increase
dealer profit margins. This possibility makes vertical price-fixing a feeble
instrument for enforcing a producers' cartel.
Nonetheless, Posner adopted Telser's free rider theory as the most per-
suasive explanation for manufacturer-imposed resale price mainte-
nance. 177 According to Posner, economic analysis suggests two possible
reasons for manufacturer-imposed resale price maintenance:
First, the manufacturer may be the cat's paw of cartelizing dealers: the
dealers want to fix prices and somehow coerce, or otherwise enlist, the
manufacturer (perhaps they pay him) to act as their agent in adminis-
tering a cartel, which he does either by fixing a uniform retail price for
his goods or by assigning nonoverlapping sales territories to the dealers
Second, the manufacturer may want to increase the amount of non-
price competition among the dealers in order to stimulate the provision
of point of sale services. 178
The first reason is a variation of the producers' cartel theory advanced
by Telser 179 and the second restates the free rider theory.180 Conceding
that neither theory has "yet been tested empirically" and "it is not en-
176. See Telser, supra note 163, at 97.
177. See R. Posner, supra note 163, at 148-65; see also Posner, supra note 6, at 9 (free
rider theory justifies price maintenance). Posner concedes that other explanations cannot
be ruled out. See R. Posner, supra note 163, at 151.
178. R. Posner, supra note 163, at 148.
179. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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tirely clear how one would go about doing so,"' 81 Posner nonetheless
concludes that vertical price restrictions "will more commonly be manu-
facturer imposed and efficiency enhancing than dealer imposed and
monopolizing." '182 It follows that such restrictions "[are] consistent with
effective competition at the manufacturing level," '183 and should be law-
ful unless proven to be part of a dealer cartel.184
Posner's reasoning is irresistible if we assume vertical price-fixing usu-
ally occurs either to enforce a cartel or to prevent free riding. Cartels are
themselves per se unlawful under Section 1185 and the free rider theory
demonstrates that vertical price-fixing may serve procompetitive func-
tions. 86 It should not be banned in all cases simply because it may cloak
a cartel, especially because the cartel is unlawful without the aid of a per
se rule against vertical price-fixing.
Recently, a third explanation has been suggested as the principal rea-
son for vertical price-fixing.8 7 In the "majority of instances," former
Assistant Attorney General Baxter has argued, retail price maintenance
can be explained by product differentiation.' 88 "Any time a manufac-
turer has successfully created a brand image and an isolated pocket of
market power that is associated with that distinctiveness and is able to
maintain a wholesale price which is in excess of his marginal cost, he has
very strong incentives to induce the retailer to sell more."189 The exist-
ence of market power1 90 inherent to product differentiation as a corollary
to vertical price-fixing was recognized by Telser. He observed that "a
necessary condition to a manufacturer's use of resale price maintenance
is that he must possess some degree of monopoly control over the price of
the product because his product is differentiated in economically relevant
respects from competing products." 191 Posner likewise saw a degree of
181. R. Posner, supra note 163, at 151.
182. Id. at 165.
183. Id. at 150.
184. Id. at 165.
185. See Regents of the Univ. v. ABC, 747 F.2d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 1984); Jack Walters
& Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
432 (1984).
186. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
187. A fourth justification for vertical price-fixing is the "loss leader" argument, which
states that it is unfair to a manufacturer to allow dealers to sell its product at discount
prices in order to attract customers into the store, because such prices may lower a prod-
uct's image and hinder a manufacturer's effort to differentiate its product. See S. Oppen-
heim, G. Weston & J. McCarthy, Federal Antitrust Laws 541-42 (1977). Although this
justification may be valid in some instances, a manufacturer may avoid the problem by
simply avoiding multiproduct outlets and by selling to only nondiscount dealers. See
Pitofsky, Commentary: In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule
Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1494 (1983). In addition, the manufac-
turer may raise its price in order to discourage dealers from using its product as loss
leader. Id.
188. Baxter, supra note 28, at 748.
189. Id.
190. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
191. Telser, supra note 163, at 87.
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market power implied by vertical price-fixing; however, he dismissed it as
"negligible." 192 Both overlooked, or at least did not discuss, the possibil-
ity that vertical price-fixing could be explained plainly and simply as a
way to exercise this limited market power-nothing more, nothing less.
This explanation of vertical price-fixing can be illustrated by drawing
on an example used by Baxter. 93 Suppose the competitive wholesale
price of a shirt with an alligator on the front is ten dollars. At this price
the manufacturer realizes a rate of return comparable to that earned by
other manufacturers selling in competitive markets. 94 Economic theory
holds that in a competitive market a manufacturer would increase his
output until rising marginal cost equals price. 195 Beyond that point sell-
ing one more shirt would actually decrease total profit because it could
be sold only at a price below the cost of making it. If a manufacturer can
sell his entire output at a wholesale price equal to marginal cost he has no
incentive to increase sales.
Suppose, however, the shirt with an alligator on the front is uniquely
attractive to consumers and the manufacturer has some market power-
some power to raise price without an unacceptable loss of sales.t 96 He
therefore sets a wholesale price of fifteen dollars, five dollars above his
marginal cost. Since each additional shirt sold will produce an additional
192. R. Posner, supra note 163, at 150.
193. See Baxter, supra note 28, at 748.
194. The process of competitive pricing has recently been described as follows:
The efficiency consequences of competition may be summarized as follows.
When each individual seller in a competitive market takes price as a parameter,
each will produce to the point where marginal cost, i.e., the cost to produce the
last unit of output, is equal to the price paid by consumers for that unit. At this
point, the competitive firm maximizes its profits. Any higher output would
drive cost above the market price, while at any lower output the market price
would exceed the cost necessary to expand output. When resources are freely
mobile between markets, price will in equilibrium be equal to marginal cost in
all markets, because higher-return markets will draw resources away from mar-
kets offering lower returns, thereby expanding aggregate output in the higher-
return market until price is restored to competitive levels.
When the aforementioned conditions are present, allocative efficiency is real-
ized: no reallocation of inputs and outputs would increase aggregate consumer
welfare as measured in quantitative terms, because any such reallocation would
decrease the value of what consumers as a whole would receive. Moreover,
with price equal to average total cost for the representative seller, economic
profits, Le., profits above that which are necessary to maintain investment at
current levels, are absent.
Johnson & Ferrill, Defining Competition: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Decisionmak-
ing, 36 Baylor L. Rev. 583, 590-91 (1984) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
195. Id.
196. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. CL 2948, 2965 n.38 (1984) ("Market
power is the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive
market."); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,27 n.46 (1984) (same);
see also Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 937, 937
(1981) ("The term 'market power' refers to the ability of a firm... to raise price above
the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly that the price increase is
unprofitable and must be rescinded.").
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five dollars of profits, the manufacturer has an incentive to induce his
dealers to engage in demand-creating activity. This might be accom-
plished by establishing a resale price of say thirty dollars, higher than
that which would otherwise be set by free-pricing retailers. Retailers
benefit because their margin is greater with vertical price-fixing than
without it.197 The manufacturer thinks his volume of sales will increase
if the retail price is fixed at thirty dollars because dealer services induced
by that price will more than offset the loss of sales caused by the artifi-
cially high retail price. 198
At first glance the economic effect here seems the same as discussed
above under the free rider theory. 199 A retail price fixed above the level
which would prevail in a free retail market induces retailer services
which generate more sales than the increased price chokes off. The
tradeoff is efficient.
One difference lies in the manufacturer's primary purpose. Under the
free rider theory, the manufacturer's goals are to induce dealer services
and increase sales by preventing free riding.20° Free riding is perceived
as an evil which keeps consumers from getting dealer services they value
and which restricts output. This fails to distinguish between manufactur-
ers who price at marginal cost and those who price above marginal cost.
The free rider argument is persuasive if the manufacturer is pricing at
marginal cost and cannot sell its entire output due to free riding. But,
where the manufacturer is exercising market power by setting price
above the marginal cpst, output is restricted by choice. The effect of ver-
tical price-fixing is not to counteract retail inefficiencies but to counteract
the normal competitive response to the manufacturer's own price policy.
Suppose, for example, our shirt manufacturer charged a competitive
wholesale price of ten dollars, produced at a level where rising marginal
cost equalled that price, but was unable to sell its entire production. Ver-
tical price-fixing imposed to prevent free riding and increasing sales
under these circumstances enhances efficiency. It enables the manufac-
turer to operate at a level of production where the competitive price
equals marginal cost, and is thus compatible with the theory of competi-
tive pricing. If one assumes these circumstances usually prevail when
vertical price-fixing is used, it is persuasive to conclude, as Posner
does,2"1 that manufacturer-imposed vertical price-fixing will usually en-
hance efficiency.
If one assumes instead that vertical price-fixing is used to offset re-
duced demand created by the manufacturer's decision to price above
197. While dealers will incur costs in rendering these services, those costs will neces-
sarily be less than the increase in the dealer's margin with vertical price-fixing. If this
were not so, dealers would have little incentive to render services.
198. See supra text accompanying note 167.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 163-67.
200. See supra note 163.
201. See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
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marginal cost, then it serves a monopolisticaz rather than competitive
goal. In a competitive market, price equals marginal cost, whereas in a
monopolistic market, price exceeds marginal cost' 3 Competition is pre-
ferred because it leads to lower prices and higher output; monopoly is
avoided because it leads to higher prices and lower output.2' Producers
naturally seek to achieve monopoly power and higher prices. In an ideal
monopolist's world, prices and output would rise simultaneously. In a
free market the inescapable penalty for raising the price is reduced sales.
Vertical price-fixing provides a way to avoid this penalty by replacing
free pricing at the retail level with contract pricing, and, in effect, sharing
monopoly profits with retailers.
Telser and Posner assumed market power created by product differen-
tiation invariably accompanies vertical price-fixing.' 5 Baxter persua-
sively argued that exercise of this market power is the principal
explanation for vertical price-fixing.' 6 If so, vertical price-fixing simply
facilitates monopoly profit 2°7 maximization through the projection of
power from one market to another by contract. If our shirt manufac-
turer had an absolute monopoly in the shirt market, most would agree
that vertical price-fixing or other vertical restrictions designed to project
that monopoly power from the manufacturing to the retail level should
be unlawful. Under such circumstances there would be no interbrand
competition justifying a restriction on intrabrand competition."'8 But
our manufacturer only has a monopoly on shirts with an alligator on the
front. At some price, this monopoly power is exhausted because con-
sumers will decide to purchase shirts without alligators for, say, twenty
dollars rather than shirts with alligators for thirty. Should antitrust law
202. The goal is monopolistic because vertical price-fixing is used to help maintain a
price higher than marginal cost, a characteristic of monopoly. See infra note 203.
203. See Gellhorn, An Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 1975 Duke LU. 1, 33 ("In
[a] monopoly... the profit-maximizing firm equates marginal cost to marginal revenue
and marginal revenue does not equalprice (price is greater).") (emphasis in original). See
infra note 212.
204. See infra note 212.
205. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
206. See Baxter, supra note 28, at 748. If a manufacturer is selling his entire output at
a price equal to his marginal cost, additional sales will drive marginal cost above price
and reduce profits. Thus vertical price-fixing will normally be attractive to a manufac-
turer who either is selling at a price above marginal cost, or cannot sell his entire output
at a price equal to marginal cost. Baxter's view that the former rather than the latter is
the principal explanation seems persuasive, because vertical price-fixing is generally fa-
vored by well established firms with recognized products and some market power rather
than by fledgling firms seeking to gain or retain a foothold in the market. See infra note
210.
207. Monopoly profit is used here to mean profit resulting from a price in excess of
marginal cost, in contrast to competitive profit which would be produced by a price equal
to marginal cost. See supra note 203.
208. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-53 (1977) ("The
market impact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for a simulta-




be concerned about limited market power derived from product differen-
tiation? Baxter says no,
not because it is clearly the right answer in any economic sense, but
because I have a strong bias in favor of letting people do whatever they
want, at least in the absence of a demonstration that they are imposing
harm on someone else, I see no reason whatsoever that a company
should not be permitted to have a go at marketing $30 shirts with alli-
gators on them.2°
Clearly, in a free market a firm should be permitted to try to sell its
product at any price it chooses. The only constraint on unilateral pricing
is economic, not legal. 210 But that is not the question. Dr. Miles does not
interfere with the manufacturer's right to preserve or create product dif-
ferentiation by unilaterally setting a wholesale price at a level which pro-
duces a thirty dollar retail price. If, however, he chooses to price the
product above his marginal cost, should the manufacturer be allowed to
avoid the usual competitive consequence of reduced output by joining
together with retailers to establish a uniform retail price?
When viewed in this way it seems apparent that vertical price-fixing
impedes the operation of competitive markets by making it easier to
maintain prices above marginal cost. While the economic effects of hori-
zontal dealer price-fixing are distinguishable, the difference is one of de-
gree, not kind. This was implicitly recognized in the Antitrust Division's
amicus brief in Monsanto urging that Dr. Miles be overruled:
While it is theoretically possible that a group of distributors might fix a
price at the same level that a manufacturer would choose to have his
goods resold, this is highly unlikely. The manufacturer would attempt
to choose a resale price level that would stimulate demand-enhancing
promotional or service activities by its dealers and thus would increase
output; his interest in maximizing profits and society's interest in en-
hancing output (and promoting interbrand competition) generally will
coincide. By contrast, if the dealer cartel were to set the price, it would
find that a still higher price, causing a reduction in demand from that
which would result from the manufacturer's preferred price, would
yield greater profits to the cartel members; the cartel would attempt to
maximize its profits at the expense of restricting overall output of the
product below the socially optimal level. Thus, horizontal dealer
price-fixing poses great dangers not present in resale price maintenance
by a manufacturer and therefore is properly subject to per se
prohibition.21'
209. Baxter, supra note 28, at 750.
210. Ideally, the economic penalty for pricing above the market would be an immedi-
ate decline in sales to zero. A farmer who offers his grain at a price above market nor-
mally incurs this penalty. Few other sellers do. Pricing in most industries involves the
exercise of market power, i.e., the ability to choose from a range of prices with no danger
that sales will fall to zero even if the price selected is above that which would prevail in a
perfectly competitive market.
211. Amicus Brief for the United States at 26 n.37, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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Under the Antitrust Division's argument, because both vertical and
horizontal price-fixing produce a higher price, the crucial question is
whether both will usually reduce output below "the socially optimal
level." Horizontal price-fixing obviously does because it is monopolistic
in nature and under monopoly conditions profit maximization dictates
higher prices and lower output than would prevail in a competitive mar-
ket.212 If, as seems likely, vertical price-fixing is generally used to maxi-
mize manufacturing profits while holding price above marginal cost, it
similarly results in higher prices and lower output. This is because the
proper comparison is between the level of output with a manufacturer's
price above marginal cost and the level of output with a manufacturer's
price equal to marginal cost. Clearly, the latter maximizes output be-
cause no rational producer will raise output beyond the level at which
rising marginal cost equals price.2 13 Since both forms of price-fixing
212. The firm with monopoly power is thus able-unlike the competitive firm-to
affect unilaterally the price at which it sells. This is the essential distinguishing
characteristic between a competitive firm and a firm with monopoly power.
Whereas the purely competitive firm must take price as a parameter, and there-
fore will expand output to the point where marginal cost is equal to the market
price, a firm with monopoly power faces a downward-sloping demand curve for
its product, i.e., it can expand sales only by lowering its price. Assuming that
the firm with monopoly power cannot discriminate in price between purchasers,
the marginal revenue obtained from an additional sale will be less than the price
paid by the marginal purchaser because in order to make that additional sale,
the monopoly firm also must reduce its price to all customers, including those
that would have purchased even without the reduction in price. Thus, unlike
the competitive firm, for whom price equals marginal cost, price exceeds margi-
nal cost for the firm with monopoly power.
Because the short-run, profit-maximizing firm with monopoly power will
continue to raise its price until any further increase would be offset by a propor-
tionately greater reduction in the quantity purchased, the monopolistic profit-
maximizing price will be at a level of output lower than that which would pre-
vail under competitive conditions. This circumstance is responsible for a princi-
pal economic objection to monopoly. Because the monopolist's product is
priced higher than the competitive price, consumers may be induced to substi-
tute products that are priced lower than the monopolist's product, even though
those alternative products actually cost more to produce. This so-called "dead
weight" loss of monopoly pricing can best be illustrated by an example. Assum-
ing that a monopolist's product costs $5.00 to produce (recognizing that cost in
economic terms includes a normal return on equity capital), and is priced by the
profit-maximizing monopolist at $5.25, a consumer may be induced by the
higher price to purchase a substitute product that is priced at S5.15. If the
substitute product is priced under competitive conditions, its price is equal to its
cost of production. Accordingly, by selecting the substitute product, the con-
sumer actually satisfies his wants by purchasing a commodity that requires
more of society's scarce resources to produce, even though its price is below
that fixed by the short-run, profit-maximizing monopolist. In this way, monop-
oly induces consumers to substitute more costly products for less costly ones.
Johnson & Ferrill, supra note 194, at 592 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
213. As is pointed out above, see supra note 189 and accompanying text, this assumes
the manufacturer could sell his entire output at a price equal to marginal cost. If that is
not the case, that is, if the manufacturer is pricing the product at marginal cost but still
cannot sell its entire output and vertical price-fixing is used to stimulate demand, then,
and only then, will vertical price-fixing be compatible with competition. This rare case
does not justify abandoning Dr. Miles. It may justify an exception to the per se rule
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present great danger of higher prices and lower output, both are properly
subject to per se prohibition214 without "elaborate inquiry as to the pre-
cise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."'21
To argue that vertical price-fixing enhances output ignores the fact
that output is first reduced by maintaining a price above marginal cost
and vertical price-fixing is then used to counteract the reduction. The
Antitrust Division's argument is persuasive only if one accepts pricing
above marginal cost as a neutral event. Such pricing is an exercise of
market power and should not be viewed neutrally.216
where the manufacturer can prove its selling price equals or approaches marginal cost.
As in the predatory pricing area, average variable cost could serve as a proxy for margi-
nal cost, since marginal cost is not susceptible to proof. See Superturf, Inc. v. Monsanto
Co., 660 F.2d 1275, 1281 (8th Cir. 1981); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340,
347 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pric-
ing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 716
(1975). The net result would be that the free rider theory would justify vertical price-
fixing only where competitive wholesale pricing fails to generate sales sufficient to operate
at the optimal level. Its primary purpose then would be demand enhancement rather
than monopoly profit maximization.
214. Since nonprice vertical restraints do not directly interfere with free pricing, the
principal method of competing in a free market, it is appropriate to assume they are
usually employed for the purpose of strengthening the dealer network by enabling it to
focus on interbrand competition. Where nonprice restraints are shown to serve monopo-
listic pricing practices at the producer level, they should be held unlawful under the rule
of reason. While vertical price-fixing may similarly enable dealers to focus on interbrand
competition, it is a clumsy tool for this purpose since it denies dealers needed price flexi-
bility in an intensely competitive market. Furthermore, the generally recognized fact that
vertical price-fixing (but not other vertical restraints) can be used only by a manufacturer
with some market power, see text accompanying supra note 36, suggests it is usually used
to facilitate exercise of that power. The critical distinction between price and nonprice
restraints is that while price restraints will usually reduce output by facilitating manufac-
turer pricing above marginal cost, nonprice restraints will not, or at least will not usually
be intended to do so.
215. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationer & Printing Co., 105 S.
Ct. 2613, 2617 (1985) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958));
see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982) ("The costs
of judging business practices under the rule of reason ...have been reduced by the
recognition ofper se rules.... For the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency,
we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a fullblown inquiry might
have proved to be reasonable.") (footnotes omitted). But see Continental T.V., Inc. v,
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) ("Once established, per se rules tend to
provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants
and the judicial system of the more complex rule-of-reason trials,... but those advan-
tages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se rules. If it were
otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced toper se rules, thus introducing an unin-
tended and undesirable rigidity in the law.").
216. This is not to say unilateral pricing designed to enhance product differentiation is
an unmitigated evil, but merely that it is incompatible with free market theory and there-
fore anticompetitive. Congress did not ban all anticompetitive behavior, and this is one
type of anticompetitive conduct which, because of its unilateral nature, falls into a "gap"
in the Sherman Act's proscription against unreasonable restraints of trade, so long as it
does not involve threatened monopolization. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). Congress did, however, ban concerted action under-
taken with the purpose and effect of increasing price and reducing output. Properly
viewed, vertical price-fixing is just such conduct.
VERTICAL PRICE-FIXING
The notion that vertical price-fixing enables producers to maximize
monopoly profits rather than increase output draws support from the
Court's recent decision in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde.2 17 Discussing the legality of tying arrangements, the Court ob-
served that tying contracts may be used by sellers with some market
power to discriminate in price among various purchasers. 21 " For exam-
ple, the manufacturer of a copying machine may charge a low price for
the machine on condition that all paper used in the machine be
purchased from the manufacturer. The price charged for the machine
may be less than high intensity users would pay without the tie, but the
manufacturer will recoup this lost profit by selling them a large quantity
of paper. Low intensity users are drawn into the market by the low price
for the machine. The net effect is that more machines are sold with the
tie than without because the price of the package varies with the intensity
of use. Should increased output achieved through tying paper to copying
machines be viewed as procompetitive or as a device for maximizing mo-
nopoly profits? The Court answered:
[T]he law draws a distinction between the exploitation of market
power by merely enhancing the price of the tying product, on the one
hand, and by attempting to impose restraints on competition in the
market for a tied product, on the other .... [A tying arrangement] ...
can increase the social costs of market power by facilitating price dis-
crimination, thereby increasing monopoly profits over what they
would be absent the tie 
.... 
29
Just as a tying contract which increases output above the level which
would prevail with a single monopolistic price provides no justification
for a tie, similarly vertical price-fixing which increases output above the
level which would prevail with a monopolistic price set by the supplier
provides no justification for vertical price-fixing. Only if the manufac-
turer's price equals marginal cost should increased output be viewed as
procompetitive.22°
CONCLUSION
The emphasis in antitrust law on practical economic effects flatly con-
217. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
218. See id. at 14.
219. Id. (citations omitted).
220. In Jefferson, the Court held that a 30% market share does not show market
power sufficient to trigger the per se rule in the context of a tying arrangement. Id. at 26-
27. Arguably this supports Posner's view that antitrust law should not be concerned with
modest levels of market power achieved through product differentiation. See supra note
192 and accompanying text. As the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor observed,
however, tying arrangements do not involve "horizontal or quasi-horizontal restraints,"
and are less suspect than arrangements which do. See Jefferson, 466 U.S. 34-35
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Vertical price-fixing does involve a horizontal restraint in
that competing dealers charge the same price for the purpose of exploiting market power
based on product differentiation.
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tradicts the formalistic reasoning of Colgate. Furthermore, Colgate is
rooted in the freedom to trade concept and therefore represents a view of
antitrust law the present Court has not embraced. There is no sound
reason for the Court to be concerned about the erosion of Colgate. Un-
fortunately, just as earlier Courts used artificial distinctions to narrow
Colgate and expand the per se rule of Dr. Miles, this Court may be will-
ing to breathe new life into the formalistic reasoning of Colgate to con-
tract the scope of Dr. Miles. Antitrust jurisprudence would be advanced
if the Court recognized Colgate as an exercise in formalism and overruled
it. If, as the Court seems to fear, Dr. Miles would be unacceptable with-
out the restraining force of Colgate, it too should be overruled. It ap-
pears, however, that while the economic justification for Dr. Miles may
have been overstated in the past,22 ' it is well founded. Properly ana-
lyzed, vertical price-fixing leads to higher prices and lower output just as
horizontal price-fixing does. So long as a category of per se antitrust
violations exists, that is where vertical price-fixing belongs.
221. Vertical price-fixing does not mean the product comes in a "competition-free
wrapping." See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 47 (1960).
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